



California’s Proposition 47 and Effectuating 
State Laws in Federal Sentencing 
Brenna Ledvora† 
Proposition 47 is a California voter initiative that reduced possessory drug of-
fenses and minor thefts from felonies to misdemeanors. The law allows individuals 
to retroactively reclassify their convictions and mandates that these convictions shall 
be considered misdemeanors “for all purposes.” Under California law, reclassified 
convictions cannot be predicate felonies for future state sentencing enhancements. 
However, federal courts have held that reclassified convictions still constitute prior 
convictions for federal sentencing enhancements. Thus, these convictions still trigger 
felony-based enhancements. This Comment argues that this result is not mandated 
by Supreme Court precedent and that it conflicts with California’s intent to amelio-
rate the effects of prior felony convictions. Proposition 47 presents a novel situation—
a retroactive state law that broadly alters the underlying conviction. Under princi-
ples of comity and federalism, federal courts should give full effect to Proposition 47 
and similar state laws in federal sentencing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Vickie Sanders was convicted in a California state court of 
felony drug possession,1 sixteen years before California voters 
would pass Proposition 47.2 Proposition 47, which was passed in 
2014, reduces most possessory drug offenses from felonies to mis-
demeanors,3 and allows California courts to retroactively redesig-
nate individuals’ felonies as misdemeanors.4 Sanders pursued re-
designation of her felony, and in 2018, a California state court 
reclassified her state conviction to a misdemeanor.5 Over twenty 
years after her initial conviction, and shortly after her prior con-
viction was designated a misdemeanor, a federal district court 
held that Sanders’s misdemeanor still constituted a felony under 
federal law.6 Due to federal sentencing enhancements, Sanders’s 
 
 1 United States v Sanders, 909 F3d 895, 898–99 (7th Cir 2018), cert denied, 139 S 
Ct 2661 (2019). Sanders was convicted in 1996, but her conviction did not become final 
until 1998. Id. 
 2 Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47), 2014 Cal Legis Serv Prop 
47, codified at Cal Penal Code § 1170.18. 
 3 Sanders, 909 F3d at 899. See also J. Richard Couzens and Tricia A. Bigelow, Prop-
osition 47: “The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act” *36 (May 2017), archived at 
https://perma.cc/HDL9-X2GZ. 
 4 Sanders, 909 F3d at 900, quoting Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k). 
 5 Sanders, 909 F3d at 899. 
 6 See id. 
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prior “felony” triggered a mandatory imprisonment of 120 
months.7 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.8 
Federal courts have uniformly ignored Proposition 47’s man-
date to treat reclassified convictions as misdemeanors “for all pur-
poses.”9 Rather, they have held that reclassified misdemeanors 
still trigger harsh sentencing enhancements based on prior felony 
convictions.10 These holdings are in direct conflict with California 
courts’ approach to Proposition 47. As one California court ex-
plained, “Proposition 47 explicitly anticipates that redesignation 
of an offense as a misdemeanor will affect the collateral conse-
quences of a felony conviction.”11 Accordingly, the California Su-
preme Court has held that reclassified misdemeanors are misde-
meanors for purposes of state sentencing.12 
Federal courts generally consider federal, not state, criminal 
law. But when applying federal recidivist enhancements, which 
increase a defendant’s sentence based on prior criminal convic-
tions, federal courts must consider state convictions in discerning 
relevant prior convictions. Federal courts define what a “prior 
conviction” is, even when the prior conviction is a state convic-
tion.13 And in the case of Proposition 47, federal courts have de-
fined “prior felony conviction” to include convictions that Califor-
nia has explicitly defined as a misdemeanor “for all purposes.”14 
This Comment argues that federal courts should give effect 
to Proposition 47. It proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes 
the role of predicate state offenses in federal sentencing and Prop-
osition 47’s attempts to reclassify certain California felony convic-
tions as misdemeanors. Part II examines how the Supreme Court 
has dealt with state law changes to predicate offenses, and how 
federal circuit courts have applied that precedent. It also consid-
ers federal courts’ current approach to Proposition 47—that Prop-
osition 47 has no effect on federal sentencing. Part III.A first ar-
gues that the federal courts’ approach is not mandated by 
Supreme Court precedent, and that it misunderstands Proposi-
tion 47’s effects on prior convictions. Parts III.B and III.C then 
 
 7 Id at 898. 
 8 Id at 906. 
 9 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k). 
 10 See Part II.D. 
 11 Sanders, 909 F3d at 900, quoting People v Khamvongsa, 214 Cal Rptr 3d 623, 625 
(Cal App 2017). 
 12 See Part II.C. 
 13 See Dickerson v New Banner Institute, Inc, 460 US 103, 111–12 (1983). 
 14 See, for example, Sanders, 909 F3d at 900–01. 
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consider how giving Proposition 47 effect in federal court would 
positively impact the federal-state balance of power and federal 
sentencing. In light of these effects, federal courts should hold that 
Proposition 47 invalidates predicate offenses for federal sentencing. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON STATE PREDICATE OFFENSES 
This Part summarizes the states’ attempts to enact criminal 
justice reform, including Proposition 47 and its impact on certain 
California offenses. It then briefly explains the role of state of-
fenses in the federal sentencing system and how California alter-
ing its criminal offenses affects federal sentencing. 
A. Criminal Justice Reform and the States 
Criminal justice reform has primarily occurred at the state 
level,15 despite bipartisan support for reform at both the state and 
federal levels.16 Congress has traditionally acted slowly and 
passed only modest changes.17 Even with recent federal reforms, 
the states have continued to lead the way in passing numerous 
and varied criminal justice laws. These reforms include (but are 
not limited to): liberalizing marijuana laws, strengthening opioid 
laws, changing bail procedures, and reducing the collateral con-
sequences for felony convictions.18 
 
 15 See Shon Hopwood, The Effort to Reform the Criminal Justice System, 128 Yale L 
J F 791, 794 n 16 (2019). 
 16 See id at 793 n 14; Maggie Astor, Left and Right Agree on Criminal Justice: They 
Were Both Wrong Before (NY Times, May 16, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/UCA6 
-422U; Jennifer Bellamy, Dan Zeidman, and Amshula Jararam, Promising Beginning: Bi-
partisan Criminal Justice Reform in Key States *7–41 (American Civil Liberties Union, 
Feb 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/R9KS-GD72. Although there is broad consensus 
on the general need for reform, at least one scholar has noted that this consensus is “ten-
uous,” and “relies upon different frames and different goals.” Benjamin Levin, The Con-
sensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 Mich L Rev 259, 263 (2018). 
 17 See Hopwood, 128 Yale L J F at 793 (cited in note 15). The exception to this his-
torical trend is the recently passed First Step Act of 2018, Pub L No 115-391, 132 
Stat 5194. The First Step Act enacted multiple reforms, including reducing statutory pun-
ishments for a variety of offenses. See id at 798–99. 
 18 See Nicole D. Porter, Top Trends in State Criminal Justice Reform, 2019 (The Sen-
tencing Project, Jan 17, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/CP42-ENFJ. See also Robert 
Alt, Criminal Justice Reform: A Survey of 2018 State Laws *4–5 (The Federalist Society, 
July 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/5WUZ-GBRQ. 
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1. State reclassification laws. 
A recent state trend is enacting laws that reclassify certain 
felonies as misdemeanors.19 Starting with California’s Proposi-
tion 47 in 2014, at least six states have passed reclassification 
laws,20 and several others have introduced reclassification bills.21 
Though these laws vary by state, all enacted and proposed laws 
reclassify simple drug possession from a felony to a misdemeanor. 
Almost all of the enacted laws define drug possession broadly by 
not specifying weight or drug type.22 Some (including Proposi-
tion 47) also raise the dollar threshold for felony theft.23 However, 
most have exclusions for people with prior criminal convictions.24 
Additionally, most of these reclassification laws are purely 
prospective.25 That means that people who commit simple drug 
possession in the future will be convicted of and sentenced to a 
misdemeanor, but people who have already been convicted cannot 
reclassify their felonies and receive lower sentences. Nor can they 
remove the collateral consequences of their felony conviction, 
which can include employment restrictions and disenfranchise-
ment.26 For those and other reasons, numerous commentators 
have noted the importance of retroactivity in various areas of 
criminal justice reform.27 
 
 19 See Brian Elderbroom and Julia Durnan, Reclassified: State Drug Law Reforms to 
Reduce Felony Convictions and Increase Second Chances *3–6 (Urban Institute, Oct 2018), 
archived at https://perma.cc/HVF5-KFSX (explaining the growth of state reclassification 
laws). 
 20 See id at *1 (discussing recent laws in California, Utah, Connecticut, Alaska, and 
Oklahoma); 2019 Colo Sess Laws Ch 291, codified in scattered sections of Colo Rev Stat 
§ 18-18. 
 21 A reclassification bill is currently pending in the Ohio state legislature, and a 
Rhode Island bill recently died in committee. See Michael Shields, Reclassifying Drug Fel-
onies Would Open Career Pathways - Retroactivity Would Maximize Reach (Policy Matters 
Ohio, Jan 15, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/N2BE-63GC; American Civil Liberties 
Union of Rhode Island, Drug Reclassification (H 5760, S 472) Died in Committee (2019), 
archived at https://perma.cc/Z39V-8TKW.  
 22 See Elderbroom and Durnan, Reclassified at *4–5 (cited in note 19). The Colorado 
law is the only enacted law to specify weights and types of drug. See 2019 Colo Sess Laws 
Ch 291 §§ 1–2, codified at Colo Rev Stat § 18-18-403.5, -406. 
 23 See Couzens and Bigelow, Proposition 47 at *27 (cited in note 3). See also, for ex-
ample, 2016 Okla Sess Laws Ch 221 § 4, codified at 21 Okla Stat § 1704. 
 24 See Elderbroom and Durnan, Reclassified at *4–5 (cited in note 19). See also, for 
example, 2019 Colo Sess Laws Ch 291 § 8, codified at Colo Rev Stat § 18-1.3-801. 
 25 See Elderbroom and Durnan, Reclassified at *5 (cited in note 19). See also, for 
example, 2019 Colo Sess Laws Ch 291 § 6, codified at Colo Rev Stat § 18-1.3-501. 
 26 See Elderbroom and Durnan, Reclassified at *1–3 (cited in note 19). 
 27 See, for example, Nathaniel W. Reisinger, Note, Redrawing the Line: Retroactive 
Sentence Reductions, Mass Incarceration, and the Battle between Justice and Finality, 
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However, two states—Oklahoma and California—have made 
their reclassification laws retroactive.28 That means the law af-
fects people who have already been convicted of a felony that is 
now classified as a misdemeanor. The extent to which prior con-
victions are affected depends on the law. Under Oklahoma’s law, 
people with felony convictions that are now classified as misde-
meanors can expunge their records,29 and people who are cur-
rently serving applicable felony sentences can apply for an accel-
erated process to commute or modify their sentence.30 As 
discussed in the next Section, Proposition 47 is retroactive in that 
people with prior felony convictions can apply for resentencing (if 
they are still serving the felony sentence) or redesignation (if they 
have already served the felony sentence).31 
2. Proposition 47. 
Proposition 47 amends various provisions of the California 
criminal code to reduce most possessory drug offenses and thefts 
involving less than $950 from felonies to misdemeanors.32 The 
maximum punishment for any newly misdemeanant offense is 
one year, unless the defendant has a designated prior convic-
tion.33 
A person currently serving a sentence for a felony that would 
be a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 may petition for resen-
tencing.34 If the petition is successful, “the petitioner’s felony 
 
54 Harv CR–CL L Rev 299, 320–25 (2019); Jeremy Haile, Farewell, Fair Cruelty: An Ar-
gument for Retroactive Relief in Federal Sentencing, 47 U Toledo L Rev 635, 640–42 (2016); 
Shields, Reclassifying Drug Felonies (cited in note 21) (arguing that Ohio’s proposed re-
classification bill should be retroactive). 
 28 The Oklahoma legislature recently amended its reclassification law—which was 
passed through a 2016 ballot measure—to apply retroactively. See 2019 Okla Sess Laws 
Ch 459, codified at 22 Okla Stat § 18; Porter, Top Trends in State Criminal Justice Reform 
at *1 (cited in note 18). 
 29 2019 Okla Sess Laws Ch 459 § 51, codified at 22 Okla Stat § 18.A.15. 
 30 2019 Okla Sess Laws Ch 459, codified at 57 Okla Stat § 332.2.F. 
 31 For a full discussion of how the California Supreme Court has interpreted Propo-
sition 47’s retroactivity, see Part II.C. 
 32 Couzens and Bigelow, Proposition 47 at *27 (cited in note 3). 
 33 See id at *137. Proposition 47 does not apply to defendants with a prior conviction 
for a designated offense, and these defendants may be sentenced up to three years impris-
onment. For more information on these disqualifying offenses, see note 43 and accompa-
nying text. 
 34 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(a): 
(a) A person who, on November 5, 2014, was serving a sentence for a conviction, 
whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a 
misdemeanor under the act that added this section (“this act”) had this act been 
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sentence shall be recalled and the petitioner resentenced to a mis-
demeanor,” unless the court determines that the defendant poses 
a danger to the public.35 A person who has completed her sentence 
for a felony that would be a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 can 
file an application before her court of sentencing.36 Then, the court 
“shall designate the felony offense or offenses as a misdemeanor.”37 
Proposition 47 expressly states that “[a] felony conviction 
that is recalled and resentenced . . . or designated as a misde-
meanor . . . shall be considered a misdemeanor for all purposes.”38 
However, petitioners whose convictions have been resentenced 
are still subject to firearm restrictions.39 Judges can also deny pe-
titions for resentencing if the prisoner “pose[s] an unreasonable 
risk of danger to public safety,”40 and Proposition 47 does not 
 
in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the 
trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request 
resentencing in accordance with [s]ections . . . amended or added by this act. 
 35 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(b): 
(b) Upon receiving a petition under subdivision (a), the court shall determine 
whether the petitioner satisfies the criteria in subdivision (a). If the petitioner 
satisfies the criteria in subdivision (a), the petitioner’s felony sentence shall be 
recalled and the petitioner resentenced to a misdemeanor pursuant to [s]ections 
. . . amended or added by this act, unless the court, in its discretion, determines 
that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to 
public safety. 
 36 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(f): 
(f) A person who has completed his or her sentence for a conviction, whether by 
trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor 
under this act had this act been in effect at the time of the offense, may file an 
application before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his 
or her case to have the felony conviction or convictions designated as misde-
meanors. 
 37 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(g): 
(g) If the application satisfies the criteria in subdivision (f), the court shall des-
ignate the felony offense or offenses as a misdemeanor. 
 38 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the California 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the “for all purposes” language, see Part II.C. 
 39 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k): 
A felony conviction that is recalled and resentenced under subdivision (b) or des-
ignated as a misdemeanor under subdivision (g) shall be considered a misde-
meanor for all purposes, except that resentencing shall not permit that person 
to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or control a firearm or prevent his 
or her conviction under [California’s felon in possession of a firearm statute]. 
 40 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(b). An “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” 
means “an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony.” Cal 
Penal Code § 1170.18(c). When determining whether a petitioner poses such a risk, the 
court can consider the petitioner’s criminal history, disciplinary and rehabilitations rec-
ords while incarcerated, and any other relevant evidence. Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(b). 
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apply to any person who has previously been convicted of certain 
violent offenses or offenses requiring sex offender registration.41 
Finally, the statute notes that “[r]esentencing pursuant to this 
section does not diminish or abrogate the finality of judgments in 
any case that does not come within the purview of this section.”42 
B. State Offenses in the Federal System 
Proposition 47, like other state sentencing reforms, only 
changes California criminal offenses and does not expressly affect 
federal incarceration. However, because parts of the federal sen-
tencing system depend on state offenses, Proposition 47’s changes 
to state offenses affect federal sentencing as well. This Section 
surveys the federal sentencing system, specific sentencing en-
hancements, and the role of state offenses in federal sentencing. 
1. Overview of the federal sentencing system. 
When a defendant is convicted of an offense in federal court, 
federal law governs the sentencing process. Three main sources 
of law guide federal sentencing. First, the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 198443 (SRA) created the modern federal sentencing system by 
setting forth the primary sentencing statute44 and facilitating the 
creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guide-
lines”).45 Second, the Guidelines create recommended sentencing 
ranges based on the defendant’s instant federal offense and prior 
 
 41 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(i). See Couzens and Bigelow, Proposition 47 at *134–36 
(cited in note 3) (listing Proposition 47’s disqualifying prior convictions). 
 42 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(n). 
 43 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3551 et seq and 
28 USC § 991 et seq. 
 44 See 18 USC § 3553(a). Section 3553(a)(1) directs courts to consider certain factors 
in sentencing. These factors include: the “nature and circumstance of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant,” the sentencing range established by the 
Guidelines, and pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission. 18 USC 
§ 3553(a). See also Erica Zunkel, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s Undervalued Sentencing Com-
mand: Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant with Rehabilitation, Training, and Treat-
ment in “the Most Effective Manner”, 9 Notre Dame J Intl & Comp L 49, 54 (2019) (noting 
that § 3553(a) “has become the federal sentencing touchstone” since the Guidelines be-
came advisory). 
 45 See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing: The Basics *1 
(Nov 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/52NG-ALEU (“[In] the landmark passage of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) . . . Congress established a new federal sentencing 
system based primarily on sentencing guidelines.”). See also generally United States Sen-
tencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov 2018) (USSG). 
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criminal history.46 Third, some federal statutes mandate mini-
mum and maximum sentences tied to the defendant’s offense.47 
Federal sentencing law is a mix of advisory and mandatory 
provisions. The Guidelines are advisory, but continue to exert sig-
nificant influence on federal sentencing.48 The Supreme Court has 
made clear that judges should begin sentencing proceedings by 
calculating the defendant’s Guidelines range, even though judges 
are not required to follow that range.49 Statutory minimum and 
maximum sentences, on the other hand, are typically manda-
tory.50 If a mandatory sentence applies, the judge must impose it. 
Both the Guidelines and federal statutes contain sentencing 
enhancements, which increase the length of the defendant’s sen-
tence based on certain facts. There are two types of enhance-
ments: nonrecidivist and recidivist.51 Nonrecidivist enhance-
ments are based on the particular circumstances of the offense, 
such as the presence of a gun during the crime.52 Recidivist en-
hancements are “based on a defendant’s prior criminal history.”53 
These enhancements are typically triggered by a prior conviction 
for a specified offense (called a predicate offense). For example, 
the federal three-strikes law imposes mandatory life imprison-
ment if the defendant is convicted of “a serious violent felony” and 
has previously been convicted of at least two qualifying felonies.54 
Recidivist enhancements are common in the US system. Every 
 
 46 See Jeff Papa and Chris Kashman, An Introduction to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 51 Ind L Rev 357, 358–60 (2018) (explaining how the Guidelines calculate a 
defendant’s sentencing range). For the Guidelines’ sentencing table, see USSG § 5A 
(demonstrating how the defendant’s offense level and criminal history interact to create 
the defendant’s sentencing range). 
 47 See United States Sentencing Commission, Overview of Mandatory Minimum Pen-
alties in the Federal Criminal Justice System *10–19 (July 2017), archived at 
https://perma.cc/X8GH-T84E (explaining federal mandatory minimum sentences and 
overviewing common mandatory minimums and maximums). 
 48 See Paul Hofer, After Ten Years of Advisory Guidelines, and Thirty Years of 
Mandatory Minimums, Federal Sentencing Still Needs Reform, 47 U Toledo L Rev 649, 
678–80 (2016). 
 49 Id at 678, citing Gall v United States, 552 US 38, 49 (2007). The Guidelines were 
mandatory for almost twenty years before the Supreme Court held that they were advisory 
in United States v Booker, 543 US 220 (2005). Empirical studies have shown that although 
Booker impacted various disparities in sentencing, it did not dramatically reduce sentence 
length. See Hofer, 47 U Toledo L Rev at 678–89 (cited in note 48). 
 50 Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior 
Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 UC Davis L Rev 1135, 1158 (2010). 
 51 Id at 1143. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 18 USC § 3559(c)(1). 
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state has statutory recidivist enhancements, and there are nu-
merous recidivist enhancements in the federal statutes and 
Guidelines.55 
2. Felony-based enhancements. 
Recidivist enhancements are often based on prior felony con-
victions.56 Because Proposition 47 reclassifies some California felo-
nies to misdemeanors, it implicates many of these enhancements. 
A felony “is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by im-
prisonment for more than one year.”57 Both the advisory Guidelines 
and mandatory federal statutes have felony-based enhancements. 
The Guidelines contain numerous recidivist enhancements 
specifically tied to the defendant’s instant federal offense.58 These 
enhancements increase the defendant’s offense level—which 
leads to a longer recommended sentence59—if the defendant has 
a prior criminal conviction. For example, if the defendant’s in-
stant offense is for unlawfully entering or remaining in the 
United States, her offense level (and thus recommended sentence) 
increases if she previously sustained a felony conviction.60 
Regardless of the defendant’s instant offense, the Guidelines 
also separately factor in the defendant’s criminal history, mean-
ing prior felony convictions are always relevant. The defendant’s 
criminal history is calculated on a point-based system, with 
points given for “each prior sentence of imprisonment.”61 Three 
points are given for each sentence “exceeding one year and one 
month,” two points for those “of at least sixty days,” and one point 
for any sentence not previously counted.62 More points correlate 
 
 55 See Russell, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 1149–50 (cited in note 50). 
 56 Id (discussing state and federal recidivist enhancements). 
 57 See Burgess v United States, 553 US 124, 130 (2008). See also USSG § 4A1.2(o) 
(“[A] ‘felony offense’ means any federal, state, or local offense punishable by death or a 
term of imprisonment exceeding one year, regardless of the actual sentence imposed.”). 
 58 Russell, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 1138 (cited in note 50) (noting that the Guidelines 
“contain enhancement provisions for virtually every type of federal offense”). 
 59 USSG § 5A. 
 60 See USSG § 2L1.2(b). This illegal reentry enhancement increases the defendant’s 
offense level depending on the type of prior conviction and the number of prior convictions. 
For example, if he committed the instant offense after sustaining “a conviction for a felony 
offense . . . for which the sentence imposed was five years or more,” his offense level is 
increased by ten levels. USSG § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A). If the imposed sentence for the prior felony 
“exceeded one year and one month,” his offense level is only increased by six levels. USSG 
§ 2L1.2(b)(2)(C). 
 61 USSG § 4A1.1. 
 62 See USSG § 4A.1.1. The calculation includes other limitations and adds points for 
other actions related to the defendant’s criminal history. See USSG § 4A.1.1: 
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to a higher criminal history category, resulting in a longer recom-
mended sentence.63 Sentences “exceeding one year and one 
month” receive the most points and encompass most felony (but 
not misdemeanor) offenses. However, the criminal history calcula-
tion exempts certain prior convictions.64 For example, it does not 
count expunged convictions65 and diversionary dispositions without 
a finding of guilt,66 but convictions that are set aside or pardoned 
“for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law” are counted.67 
Some of the specific enhancements have similar exceptions.68 
 
(a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and 
one month. 
(b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days 
not counted in (a). 
(c) Add 1 point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4 
points for this subsection. 
(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any 
criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, im-
prisonment, work release, or escape status. 
(e) Add 1 point for each prior sentence resulting from a conviction of a crime of 
violence that did not receive any points under (a), (b), or (c) above because such 
sentence was treated as a single sentence, up to a total of 3 points for this sub-
section. 
 63 See USSG § 5A. 
 64 Although the definitions for criminal history calculation use the term “prior sen-
tence”, “the definitions for ‘prior sentence’ essentially equate ‘prior sentence’ with prior 
conviction.” Thomas W. Hutchison, Sigmund G. Popko, Deborah Young, Michael P. O’Con-
nor, and Celia M. Rumann, Federal Sentencing Law and Practice § 4A1.1.5(b) (2020 ed). 
The Guidelines define “prior sentence” as “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudi-
cation of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere.” USSG 
§ 4A1.2(a)(1). A “sentence of imprisonment” is “a sentence of incarceration and refers to 
the maximum sentence imposed.” USSG § 4A1.2(b)(1). The determination of the length of 
the sentence of imprisonment is “based on the sentence pronounced, not the length of time 
actually served.” Hutchison, et al, Federal Sentencing Law § 4A1.1.6(a). 
 65 USSG § 4A1.2(j). Expunged convictions can still be considered if the judge decides 
to depart from the sentencing range due to the inadequacy of the criminal history category. 
USSG § 4A1.3. 
 66 USSG § 4A1.2(f). 
 67 USSG § 4A1.2 n 10: 
A number of jurisdictions have various procedures pursuant to which previous 
convictions may be set aside or the defendant may be pardoned for reasons un-
related to innocence or errors of law, e.g., in order to restore civil rights or to 
remove the stigma associated with a criminal conviction. Sentences resulting 
from such convictions are to be counted. However, expunged convictions are not 
counted. 
 68 See, for example, USSG § 2K2.1 n 10 (directing courts to “use only those felony convic-
tions that receive criminal history points” when applying the firearm recidivist enhancement). 
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Many federal statutory enhancements are also based on felo-
nies.69 These enhancements are typically mandatory.70 They 
lengthen the defendant’s sentence by increasing the mandatory 
minimum or maximum sentence.71 One statutory enhancement 
that often arises in Proposition 47 litigation is the “felony drug 
offense” enhancement. Section 841 of the Controlled Substances 
Act72 (CSA) mandates enhancements if the defendant commits 
certain drug offenses “after a prior conviction for a felony drug 
offense has become final.”73 A felony drug offense is a federal, 
state, or foreign drug offense “punishable by imprisonment for 
more than one year.”74 Prior to the First Step Act of 2018,75 § 841 
doubled the mandatory minimum if the defendant had a prior 
conviction.76 The First Step Act amended § 841, which now in-
creases the maximum sentence allowed by statute if the defend-
ant has a prior felony drug offense.77 Unlike the Guidelines and 
some statutory enhancements, § 841 does not explicitly exempt 
any prior convictions. 
 
 69 For example, one common statutory enhancement is contained in the Armed Ca-
reer Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2185, codified as amended at 
18 USC § 924(e). The ACCA mandates fifteen years to life imprisonment if the defendant 
is convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and he has “three previous convictions . . . 
for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 18 USC § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines a 
“violent felony” as an offense with an element of force that is punishable by at least one 
year, or an offense that is enumerated in the statute. 18 USC § 924(e)(2)(B). A “serious 
drug offense” is defined as an offense involving a controlled substance that has a maximum 
imprisonment of ten years or more, which encompasses felony drug offenses. 18 USC 
§ 924(e)(2)(A). 
 70 Russell, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 1144 (cited in note 50). 
 71 Id at 1158. 
 72 Pub L No 91-513, 84 Stat 1242 (1970), codified as amended at 21 USC § 801 et seq. 
 73 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(C), (D), (E)(ii), (E)(iii)(2)–(3). 
 74 See 21 USC § 802(44); Burgess, 553 US at 130 (holding that § 841(b)’s “felony drug 
offense” is defined by § 802(44)). 
 75 Pub L No 115-391, 132 Stat 5194. 
 76 See United States Sentencing Commission and Office of Education & Sentencing 
Practice, ESP Insider Express Special Edition: First Step Act *2 (Feb 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/5FQR-6AP8. For example, § 841(b)(1)(A), which has a ten-year statutory 
penalty, previously imposed a twenty-year mandatory sentence if the defendant had one 
prior conviction for a felony drug offense—in essence, a recidivist enhancement of ten 
years. Id. 
 77 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(C) (increases the maximum sentence from twenty to thirty 
years); 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(D) (from five to ten years); 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(E)(ii) (from 
twenty to thirty years); 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(E)(iii)(2) (from five to ten years); 21 USC 
§ 841(b)(1)(E)(iii)(3) (from one to four years). 
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3. State law and predicate offenses. 
Federal law governs the mechanics of applying federal recid-
ivist enhancements. Although a federal enhancement can be 
based on a state conviction for a state offense, federal law defines 
which offenses constitute a predicate offense.78 The meaning of 
“conviction” depends on the statute.79 Absent a clear indication to 
the contrary, federal law (not state law) defines “conviction.”80 
Unlike the facts triggering mandatory nonrecidivist enhance-
ments (which must be found by a jury), the fact of a prior convic-
tion can be found by a judge.81 When determining whether a con-
viction triggers an enhancement, federal courts generally look to 
the law that applied at the time of the prior conviction.82 
Under federal law, a state’s postconviction actions generally 
do not alter federal sentencing. This is despite the large number 
of state laws that provide postconviction relief.83 These laws vary 
by jurisdiction. A common form of postconviction relief is ex-
pungement, which removes a past conviction from an individual’s 
criminal record.84 Additionally, many states have diversionary 
 
 78 For examples of predicate offense definitions, see notes 69–74 and accompanying 
text. 
 79 See Dickerson v New Banner Institute, Inc, 460 US 103, 113 n 7 (1983). 
 80 See id at 111–12 (“Whether one has been ‘convicted’ within the language of the 
[federal] gun control statutes is necessarily . . . a question of federal, not state, law, despite 
the fact that the predicate offense and its punishment are defined by the law of the 
State.”); id at 119–20 (“[I]n the absence of a plain indication to the contrary . . . it is to be 
assumed when Congress enacts a statute that it does not intend to make its application 
dependent on state law.”), quoting NLRB v Natural Gas Utility District, 402 US 600, 603 
(1971); United States v Dyke, 718 F3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir 2013) (“Neither, of course, does 
state law normally dictate the meaning of a federal statute, at least absent some evidence 
Congress sought to defer to and incorporate state law.”); United States v Martinez-Cortez, 
354 F3d 830, 832 (8th Cir 2004) (“Whether an earlier sentence counts for [the Guidelines’] 
criminal history purposes is a question of federal law.”). 
 81 See Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). See also 
Russell, 43 UC Davis L Rev at 1146–48 (cited in note 50) (describing the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding sentencing enhancements and the Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial). 
 82 See McNeill v United States, 563 US 816, 820 (2011) (looking at the state law that 
applied at the time of defendant’s prior conviction to determine whether he was eligible 
for a statutory enhancement). See also United States v Bermudez-Zamora, 788 F Appx 
523, 524 (9th Cir 2019) (following the holding from McNeill for a Guidelines enhancement). 
 83 See Restoration of Rights Project, 50-State Comparison: Judicial Expungement, 
Sealing, and Set-aside (Dec 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/4C3N-7NLD (noting each 
state’s postconviction relief, including expungement, deferred adjudication, and pardon 
laws). 
 84 See Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (defining “Expungement of Record”). 
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dispositions, such as deferred judgments, which typically “pre-
vent entry of the underlying judgment of conviction.”85 An excep-
tion to the general rule that state action does not alter federal 
sentencing is state court vacatur. The Supreme Court has ex-
plained that if a conviction is vacated or reversed on direct appeal, 
it cannot constitute a predicate offense.86 
Under Proposition 47, certain offenses—namely, possessory 
drug offenses and minor theft—no longer fit the federal definition 
of felony. That is because Proposition 47 amended California’s 
criminal code to reduce these offenses to misdemeanors with an 
imprisonment term of one year or less.87 Defendants have thus 
challenged their federal enhancements under § 84188 and the 
Guidelines,89 arguing that their reclassified convictions are no 
longer predicate felonies. Defendants have argued this both on 
direct appeal90 and through postconviction challenges.91 
28 USC § 2255 provides the primary postconviction remedy 
by which federal prisoners can challenge their sentences.92 Sec-
tion 2255 authorizes prisoners to move “to vacate, set aside or cor-
rect [their] sentence” if “the sentence was imposed in violation of 
the Constitution or laws of the United States.”93 There are a num-
ber of limits on § 2255 motions, including a one-year statute of 
limitations and restrictions on filing second or successive mo-
tions.94 Additionally, defendants cannot appeal a § 2255 motion 
unless a judge issues a certificate of appealability, which is issued 
only if the defendant “has made a substantial showing of the de-
nial of a constitutional right.”95 Though these limits on 
 
 85 Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (defining “Judgment”). See also James 
A. Shapiro, Comity of Errors: When Federal Sentencing Guidelines Ignore State Law De-
criminalizing Sentences, 41 Akron L Rev 231, 231 (2008). 
 86 See Part II.A. 
 87 Couzens and Bigelow, Proposition 47 at *137–38 (cited in note 3). If the defendant 
has previously been convicted of a designated prior, the court may sentence him to sixteen 
months, two years, or three years. Id. 
 88 See Part II.D.1. 
 89 See Part II.D.2. 
 90 See, for example, United States v Sanders, 909 F3d 895, 899 (7th Cir 2018). 
 91 See, for example, United States v McGee, 760 F Appx 610, 611 (10th Cir 2019). 
 92 See Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King, and Orin S. Kerr, 7 Crim-
inal Procedure § 28.9(a) (4th ed 2019). 
 93 28 USC § 2255(a). 
 94 See LaFave, et al, Criminal Procedure § 28.9(b) (cited in note 92). 
 95 28 USC § 2253(c). See also David G. Knibb, Federal Court of Appeals Manual 
§ 16:2 (6th ed 2019) (explaining that the requirement of a certificate of appealability has 
made § 2255 appeals “effectively . . . discretionary”). 
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postconviction relief have posed obstacles, defendants have con-
tinued to challenge their enhanced sentences in the Proposi-
tion 47 context. 
The Supreme Court has never considered a law like Proposi-
tion 47—a retroactive reclassification law. Nonetheless, the fed-
eral courts have almost uniformly rejected defendants’ direct and 
postconviction challenges, as illustrated in the next Part. 
II.  COURTS’ CURRENT APPROACHES 
Almost all federal courts to consider the issue have held that 
Proposition 47 does not reclassify felonies for federal sentencing 
enhancements. This result is not mandated by Supreme Court 
precedent, and it conflicts with the California Supreme Court’s 
holding that convictions reclassified under Proposition 47 do not 
constitute predicate offenses for future state sentencing enhance-
ments. The federal courts are thus out of step in their approach 
to federal sentencing. 
This Part considers when changes in state law affect federal 
sentencing. Part II.A discusses Supreme Court precedent on this 
topic. Part II.B examines how federal circuit courts have applied 
this precedent to other state laws. Finally, Parts II.C and II.D 
contrast the California and federal courts’ differing approaches to 
Proposition 47. 
A. Supreme Court Precedent on State Predicate Offenses 
Supreme Court precedent on how state laws affect federal 
sentencing is limited. The Court has never considered a retroac-
tive reclassification state law like Proposition 47. It has, however, 
considered a small number of other laws affecting state convic-
tions. These decisions have laid the framework for determining 
when state action alters prior convictions: federal law defines 
“conviction,” and subsequent state actions generally do not affect 
the historical fact of conviction. 
In Dickerson v New Banner Institute, Inc,96 the Supreme 
Court held that an expunged conviction still constituted a predi-
cate offense in the context of a federal gun statute.97 First, the 
Court established that “[w]hether one has been ‘convicted’ within 
the language of the gun control statutes is necessarily . . . a 
 
 96 460 US 103 (1983). 
 97 Id at 114. 
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question of federal, not state, law.”98 This is true even though “the 
predicate offense and its punishment are defined by the law of the 
State.”99 Second, the Court acknowledged “an obvious exception 
to the literal language of the [federal] statute for one whose pred-
icate conviction had been vacated or reversed on direct appeal.”100 
But the Court held that expungement under state law does not 
fall into this exception for vacated or reversed convictions because 
expungement “does not alter the historical fact of the convic-
tion.”101 It explained that “[expungement] does not alter the legal-
ity of the previous conviction and does not signify that the defend-
ant was innocent of the crime to which he pleaded guilty.”102 
The Court next applied this reasoning in McNeill v United 
States,103 and held that a prospective change to the state’s defini-
tion of a predicate offense did not alter the defendant’s prior con-
viction.104 Clifton Terelle McNeill was convicted of a North Caro-
lina offense that, at the time of his conviction, had an 
imprisonment term of at least ten years and thus qualified as a 
predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act105 
(ACCA).106 By the time of his sentencing for the ACCA enhance-
ment, North Carolina had lowered the imprisonment term such 
that McNeill’s offense would no longer qualify.107 The Court held 
that this change did not affect his federal sentencing.108 It ex-
plained that whether a defendant has a “previous conviction” is a 
“backward-looking question.”109 The only way to answer that “is 
to consult the law that applied at the time of that conviction.”110 
The Court noted that “[i]t cannot be correct that subsequent 
 
 98 Id at 115. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Dickerson, 460 US at 115. The Court explained that this “obvious exception” was 
first recognized in a footnote in a case decided three years previously. Id, citing Lewis v 
United States, 445 US 55, 61 n 5 (1980). 
 101 Dickerson, 460 US at 115. 
 102 Id. The Court referred to the law at issue in Dickerson as an “expunction” statute. 
The terms expungement and expunction are interchangeable in this context: both refer to 
laws that generally “remov[e] [ ] a conviction . . . from a person’s criminal record.” Black’s 
Law Dictionary (defining “Expungement of Record”) (cited in note 84). For consistency, 
this Comment solely uses the term “expungement.” 
 103 563 US 816 (2011). 
 104 Id at 824. 
 105 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2185, codified as amended at 18 USC § 924(e). 
 106 McNeill, 563 US at 818–19. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id at 824. 
 109 Id at 820. 
 110 McNeill, 563 US at 820. 
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changes in state law can erase an earlier conviction for ACCA 
purposes.”111 Despite this seemingly strong language, in a foot-
note, the Court declined to rule on a retroactive state law change: 
[T]his case does not concern a situation in which a State sub-
sequently lowers the maximum penalty applicable to an of-
fense and makes that reduction available to defendants pre-
viously convicted and sentenced for that offense. . . . We do 
not address whether or under what circumstances a federal 
court could consider the effect of that state action.112 
Because Proposition 47 applies retroactively, McNeill’s holding 
does not control whether convictions reclassified under Proposi-
tion 47 constitute predicate offenses. 
In Johnson v United States,113 the Court reaffirmed that a va-
cated conviction cannot constitute a predicate offense.114 A Geor-
gia state court vacated Samuel Johnson’s prior convictions be-
cause he had not affirmatively waived his right to counsel.115 
Johnson then moved to vacate his ACCA enhancement under a 
postconviction motion.116 Although the Court held that the statute 
of limitations had run on Johnson’s motion, it acknowledged that 
he would have been entitled to federal resentencing if he had 
timely filed.117 In addition to reinforcing that vacated convictions 
cannot be predicate offenses, the Court confirmed that a defend-
ant who “successfully attack[s] his state conviction in state court 
or on federal habeas review [can] then ‘apply for reopening of any 
federal sentence enhanced by the state sentences.’”118 
Though the Supreme Court has articulated a general frame-
work for determining whether state action alters prior convic-
tions, numerous unanswered questions remain. The Court has 
not answered how courts should analyze laws falling somewhere 
between expungement (postconviction relief unrelated to the un-
derlying legality of the conviction) and vacatur (which erases the 
prior conviction, typically due to legal error or constitutional is-
sues). Nor has it explained how retroactivity affects this analysis. 
 
 111 Id at 823. 
 112 Id at 825 n *. 
 113 544 US 295 (2005). 
 114 Id at 303 (“Our cases . . . assume . . . that a defendant given a sentence enhanced 
for a prior conviction is entitled to a reduction if the earlier conviction is vacated.”). 
 115 Id at 300. 
 116 Id at 301. 
 117 Johnson, 544 US at 302–03. 
 118 Id at 303, quoting Custis v United States, 511 US 485, 497 (1994). 
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The next Section examines how the lower courts have approached 
these issues. 
B. Lower Federal Courts’ Application of Precedent 
The lower federal courts have applied Supreme Court prece-
dent narrowly. In general, they have held that state action does 
not affect state convictions for federal sentencing purposes, re-
gardless of whether that state action is prospective or retroactive. 
1. Prospective state laws. 
The federal circuit courts have held that most state laws al-
tering predicate convictions do not affect federal sentencing. Un-
der the Guidelines, circuit courts treat diversionary dispositions 
as convictions.119 And despite the Guidelines’ textual exemption 
for expunged convictions, most courts still count expunged con-
victions that are not based on actual innocence or constitutional 
invalidity.120 For statutory enhancements, every circuit court to 
consider the issue has held that “a deferred, expunged or dis-
missed state conviction qualifies as a prior conviction under 
§ 841.”121 
2. Retroactive state laws. 
However, some courts have suggested that retroactivity may 
alter the above analysis.122 Since McNeill, multiple circuits have 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court left open the issue of ret-
roactivity.123 But prior to Proposition 47, no circuit court reached 
 
 119 Shapiro, 41 Akron L Rev at 231–32 (cited in note 85). 
 120 See, for example, United States v Townsend, 408 F3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir 2005); 
United States v Dobovsky, 279 F3d 5, 8–9 (1st Cir 2002). See also Hutchison, et al, Federal 
Sentencing Law § 4A1.1.5(m)(iii) (cited in note 64) (explaining that the majority of circuit 
courts to consider the issue only discount “expungement to convictions set aside because 
of innocence or errors of law”). 
 121 United States v Pritchett, 749 F3d 417, 426–27 (6th Cir 2014) (collecting cases). 
 122 Before McNeill was decided, the Third Circuit held that a Pennsylvania law re-
ducing certain felony drug offenses to misdemeanors did not alter the conviction for federal 
sentencing purposes. See United States v McGlory, 968 F2d 309, 349 (3d Cir 1992). In a 
footnote, the court noted that a retroactive provision in the state statute, which was later 
struck down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, “could have provided the result [de-
fendant] desires.” Id at 351 n 33. After McNeill, several district courts have held that a 
state law’s retroactivity affects defendants’ convictions for federal sentencing enhance-
ments. See note 146 (discussing California district courts’ treatment of Proposition 47). 
 123 In considering New York sentencing reforms, which reduced penalties for certain 
drug offenses and allowed retroactive resentencing for some incarcerated individuals, two 
circuits noted McNeill’s open question. See Cortes-Morales v Hastings, 827 F3d 1009, 
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the merits of whether a state law that retroactively alters the de-
fendant’s conviction affects federal sentencing. Several circuits 
have, however, considered retroactive changes to the defendant’s 
sentence length. 
Three circuits have held that a state court’s retroactive re-
duction to a defendant’s probation term does not affect the Guide-
lines’ criminal history calculation.124 The Guidelines’ criminal his-
tory calculation adds points if the defendant committed his 
instant federal offense while under probation.125 To avoid having 
points added, defendants sought and received retroactive state 
court orders lowering their state probation term such that they 
were not on probation when they committed their federal of-
fense.126 The circuits focused on the text of the Guidelines in their 
analysis. Each noted that courts must count convictions that are 
set aside for “reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law.”127 
 
1013–14 (11th Cir 2016) (noting that the Court in McNeill “did not consider” a retroactive 
reduction, and that “[a]ccordingly, [the defendant] can succeed on the merits of his claim 
only if the New York sentencing reductions apply retroactively”); Rivera v United States, 
716 F3d 685, 689 (2d Cir 2013) (clarifying that “[t]he state sentencing scheme considered 
by the Court in McNeill, however, applied only prospectively, . . . and in a footnote, the 
Supreme Court limited its holding to similarly non-retroactive statutory schemes.”). Be-
cause both circuits held that the law was not retroactive as to the defendant, they did not 
reach this Comment’s topic. See Cortes-Morales, 827 F3d at 1015–16; Rivera, 716 F3d at 
689–90. 
 Several federal district courts in New York have held that a prior conviction cannot 
constitute a predicate offense if the New York law allows retroactive resentencing for the 
defendant’s offense, even if the defendant himself is not eligible for resentencing. See 
United States v Cabello, 401 F Supp 3d 362, 364, 366 n 5 (EDNY 2019); United States v 
Calix, 2014 WL 2084098, *14–15 (SDNY); United States v Jackson, 2013 WL 4744828, *4 
(SDNY). The Second Circuit discussed these cases when holding that failure to raise this 
retroactivity argument is not ineffective assistance of counsel. See Saxon v United States, 
695 F Appx 616, 620 (2d Cir 2017). Though not reaching the merits of the issue, the circuit 
noted that “the import of [the McNeill] footnote . . . is far from clear,” and that it “[did] not 
mean to suggest that we agree with . . . the conclusions of other district judges in the 
Southern District of New York.” Id at 620–21. 
 124 See United States v Yepez, 704 F3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir 2012) (en banc) (Yepez II); 
United States v Pech-Aboytes, 562 F3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir 2009); United States v Martinez-
Cortez, 354 F3d 830, 832 (8th Cir 2004). See also Andrew Tan, Note, Breaking Bad Sen-
tencing Habits: How State Courts’ Retroactive Modifications of Probation Terms Affect Fed-
eral Mandatory Sentencing, 86 S Cal L Rev 1079, 1096–1106 (2013) (discussing the cir-
cuits’ decisions). 
 125 See USSG § 4A1.1.(d). 
 126 Pech-Aboytes, 562 F3d at 1236–37; Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1089–90; Martinez-Cortez, 
354 F3d at 832. The district courts in these cases used nunc pro tunc orders. Nunc pro 
tunc means “[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court’s inherent power.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019). If a court enters an order nunc pro tunc, it “shall have the 
same legal force and effect as if made at the time when it should have been made.” Id. 
 127 Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1091, quoting USSG § 4A1.2 n 10 (“Even when a conviction is 
set aside for ‘reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law,’ we still count the resulting 
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Because the state courts modified the defendants’ state sentences 
so that they received lower federal sentences, the state sentences 
still counted for the Guidelines’ criminal history calculation.128 
Before being overturned en banc, a Ninth Circuit panel broke 
with the other circuits and held that these sentences do not count. 
The panel’s decision relied heavily on principles of comity and fed-
eralism.129 Comity is the general principle that one sovereign 
should respect another sovereign’s laws.130 In the federal and 
state context, this concept is intertwined with federalism: federal 
courts should respect state courts’ decisions.131 The panel ex-
plained that “[w]here, as here, state laws permit the modification 
of ongoing terms of probation, principles of comity . . . require that 
the federal courts should, where possible, recognize state court 
actions terminating those probationary terms.”132 
The en banc court reversed the panel 6–5.133 Though the 
panel’s decision had primarily rested on comity and federalism, 
the en banc majority did not deeply analyze these issues.134 Ra-
ther, it noted that the panel’s approach was “closer to abdication 
than comity” and that “[s]tate courts cannot be given the author-
ity to change a defendant’s federal sentence.”135 
The Ninth Circuit panel’s deference to state courts and state 
laws has not been followed by other federal circuits analyzing 
Proposition 47. As the following sections discuss, the federal and 
California courts have adopted conflicting approaches regarding 
Proposition 47’s effect on recidivist enhancements. 
 
sentence.”) (emphasis in original); Pech-Aboytes, 562 F3d at 1238, quoting Martinez-Cortez, 
354 F3d at 832 (“[C]ourts must count sentences for convictions that, for reasons unrelated 
to innocence or errors of law, are set aside or for which the defendant is pardoned.”). 
 128 See Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1091; Pech-Aboytes, 562 F3d at 1238–39, quoting Martinez-
Cortez, 354 F3d at 832. 
 129 See United States v Yepez, 652 F3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir 2011) (Yepez I), revd en 
banc, 704 F3d 1087 (9th Cir 2012). For more information on principles of comity and fed-
eralism, see Part III.B.1. 
 130 See Gil Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of American Federalism, 90 
Notre Dame L Rev 1310, 1312 (2015). 
 131 See Yepez I, 652 F3d at 1190 (“[P]rinciples of comity and federalism [ ] counsel 
against substituting our judgment for that of the state courts.”), quoting Taylor v Maddox, 
366 F3d 992, 999 (9th Cir 2004). 
 132 Yepez I, 652 F3d at 1190. See also Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1102–03 (Wardlaw dissenting). 
 133 See generally Yepez II, 704 F3d 1087. Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw, who authored 
the original panel decision, also authored the en banc dissent, which was joined by the 
four other dissenters. The dissent reemphasized the original panel’s reasoning. See id 
(Wardlaw dissenting). 
 134 See id at 1091 (majority). 
 135 Id. 
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C. The California Supreme Court’s Interpretation of 
Proposition 47 
The California Supreme Court has held that the intent be-
hind Proposition 47’s “for all purposes” language is to ameliorate 
the collateral consequences of a felony conviction.136 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court explained that “the fact that Proposition 47 
did not expressly mention recidivist offenders does not mean that 
voters intended to deny those resentenced under the measure any 
further mitigation of their punishment.”137 Rather,  
[f]rom [ ] particular statements in the ballot materials for 
Proposition 47, it follows that a reduced penalty for a crime 
that had previously been classified as a felony would include 
a penalty that takes the form of an enhancement or other re-
cidivist-based punishment that was alleged with that same 
felony.138 
The California Supreme Court has therefore held that reclas-
sified convictions cannot be predicate felonies for future state sen-
tencing enhancements.139 Further, it held that Proposition 47 
ameliorates some already imposed sentencing enhancements. A 
sentencing enhancement based on a redesignated conviction can 
be challenged if “the judgment containing the sentence enhance-
ment was not final when Proposition 47 took effect.”140 And re-
gardless of finality, a defendant who successfully petitions for re-
sentencing “may . . . challenge a felony-based enhancement 
contained in the same judgment.”141 
The court reached this holding by explaining that Proposi-
tion 47’s resentencing and redesignation provisions “both clearly 
reflect an intent to have full retroactive application.”142 Though 
Proposition 47’s directive that reclassified convictions “be misde-
meanors for all purposes” does not use similar retroactive 
 
 136 See People v Buycks, 422 P3d 531, 545–56 (Cal 2018). 
 137 Id at 545. 
 138 Id at 546. 
 139 Id at 540 (“Proposition 47 . . . mandates that the reduced conviction ‘shall be con-
sidered a misdemeanor for all purposes.’ . . . [This], therefore, plainly extends the retroac-
tive ameliorative effects of Proposition 47 to mitigate any future collateral consequence of 
a felony conviction that is reduced under the measure.”) (emphasis in original), quoting 
Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k). 
 140 People v Foster, 447 P3d 228, 232 (Cal 2019), citing Buycks, 422 P3d at 540. 
 141 Buycks, 422 P3d at 540. 
 142 Id at 541. 
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language,143 the court noted that “Proposition 47 was intended to 
broadly mitigate the collateral penal consequences of certain nar-
cotics and larceny-related offenses.”144 Thus, under state prece-
dent, reclassified convictions can only be predicate felonies for 
judgments that were final when Proposition 47 took effect.145 
In sum, the California Supreme Court interpreted the “for all 
purposes” language to require that redesignated convictions be 
treated as misdemeanors in most state sentencing proceedings. 
This holding was largely based on Proposition 47’s intent to 
broadly ameliorate the consequences of certain convictions. As 
the next section demonstrates, the federal courts have not de-
ferred to Proposition 47’s intent or to the California Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of California law. 
D. Federal Circuit Courts’ Approach to Proposition 47 
The California Supreme Court’s holding applies only to state 
sentencing; federal law determines Proposition 47’s effect on fed-
eral sentencing. And federal circuit courts have uniformly disre-
garded California’s interpretation of Proposition 47.146 In a vari-
ety of contexts, courts have held that convictions reclassified 
under Proposition 47 still count as predicate offenses for federal 
recidivist enhancements, including § 841 of the CSA and the 
Guidelines’ enhancements. 
 
 143 See id. 
 144 Id at 543. 
 145 Buycks, 422 P3d at 543. The California Supreme Court relied on the principle ar-
ticulated in In re Estrada, 408 P2d 948 (Cal 1965). See Buycks, 422 P3d at 542–43. The 
Estrada rule presumes that in the absence of a “clear intention concerning any retroactive 
effect, ‘a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the criminal law 
to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that 
are final and sentences that are not.’” Id at 542, quoting People v Conley, 373 P3d 435, 440 
(Cal 2016). 
 146 Starting with the Ninth Circuit, all circuit courts to consider the issue have held 
that reclassification under Proposition 47 does not affect federal sentencing. See, for ex-
ample, United States v Diaz, 838 F3d 968, 971 (9th Cir 2016). But before the Ninth Circuit 
ruled on the issue, multiple judges in the Central District of California held otherwise. See 
United States v Pagan, 2016 WL 8729980, *6 (CD Cal); United States v Norwood, 2016 WL 
269571, *2–4 (CD Cal); United States v Summey, 2015 US Dist LEXIS 175511, *11 (CD 
Cal). Even after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, one California district court interpreted the 
Ninth Circuit’s binding decision as foreclosing the defendant’s statutory claim, but leaving 
open constitutional issues. See Clay v United States, 2018 WL 6333671, *4 (CD Cal). The 
court held that “it would violate [defendant’s] right to due process of law and the Eighth 
Amendment to keep the 841(b)(1) enhancement in place after learning that his prior is 
treated by clear retroactive state law as if it had never been a felony.” Id, citing Johnson, 
544 US at 303. 
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1. “Felony drug offense” under § 841 of the CSA. 
All federal circuit courts to consider the issue have held that 
a conviction reclassified under Proposition 47 is still a felony drug 
offense under § 841 of the CSA’s recidivist enhancement. The 
Third,147 Seventh,148 Eighth,149 and Ninth150 Circuits each consid-
ered defendants who challenged their mandatory § 841 enhance-
ment on direct appeal because of a reclassified California convic-
tion.151 All employed similar reasoning.152 They focused on the text 
of § 841, which mandates a sentencing enhancement “after a prior 
conviction for a felony drug offense has become final”153 and noted 
that “prior conviction” is defined by federal law, not state law.154 
Because § 841 is “backward-looking,”155 they considered “whether 
 
 147 United States v London, 747 F Appx 80, 82 (3d Cir 2018). 
 148 United States v Sanders, 909 F3d 895, 898–99 (7th Cir 2018). 
 149 United States v Santillan, 944 F3d 731, 732 (8th Cir 2019). 
 150 Diaz, 838 F3d at 971. 
 151 Because the defendants were sentenced prior to the First Step Act, their § 841 
enhancements imposed a mandatory minimum. Joe Ramon Santillan received twenty 
years, Vickie Sanders received ten, Anthony London received twenty, and Jesse Vasquez 
(the defendant in Diaz) received life imprisonment. See Santillan, 944 F3d at 736; Sand-
ers, 909 F3d at 898–99; London, 747 F Appx at 82; Diaz, 838 F3d at 971. 
 152 The courts all expressly relied on the other circuits’ decisions. The Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Diaz, which was decided first, has been particularly influential. See, for exam-
ple, Santillan, 944 F3d at 736 (“Because we find persuasive the reasoning of the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in [Diaz], we disagree [with the defendant].”). 
 153 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B) (1970), amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub L 
No 115-391, 132 Stat 5194. See Santillan, 944 F3d at 732–33, quoting United States v 
Funchess, 422 F3d 698, 703 (8th Cir 2010) (looking to the language of § 841 and explaining 
that whether to apply “the prior drug conviction enhancement . . . is a matter of statutory 
interpretation”); Sanders, 909 F3d at 901 (“As always, we must begin[ ] with the plain 
language of the statute. . . . Section 841(b) states that a defendant is subject to a ten-year 
minimum term of imprisonment if she commits a federal drug offense ‘after a prior con-
viction for a felony drug offense has become final.’”), quoting 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(B) (quo-
tation marks and citations omitted); London, 747 F Appx at 84 (“[W]e begin the same way 
we begin all inquiries involving statutory interpretation—with the text of the statutory 
provision. . . . [The statute] requires only that the defendant commit his federal offense 
after his prior conviction ‘has become final.’”), quoting 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A); Diaz, 838 
F3d at 974 (“‘[A]s a matter of plain statutory meaning there [is] . . . no question’ the de-
fendant committed his crime ‘after a [prior state felony] conviction’ has become final.”) 
(emphasis in original), quoting United States v Dyke, 718 F3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir 2013). 
 154 See Santillan, 944 F3d at 733 (“[T]he question of what constitutes a ‘prior convic-
tion’ for purposes of § 841(b)(1)(A) is a matter of federal, not state, law.”) (quotation marks 
and citations omitted); Sanders, 909 F3d at 900 (“To determine whether a defendant has 
a prior state conviction for purposes of applying a federal recidivism enhancement provi-
sion, we look to federal law.”); London, 747 F Appx at 84 (“The interpretation of [§ 841] is 
a matter of federal law, rather than state law.”); Diaz, 838 F3d at 972 (“Federal law, not 
state law, governs our interpretation of federal statutes.”). 
 155 Santillan, 944 F3d at 733, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 973; Sanders, 909 F3d at 901, 
quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 973; London, 747 F Appx at 84, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 973. 
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the defendant was previously convicted, not the particulars of 
how state law later might have permitted relief from the defend-
ant’s state conviction.”156 The circuits thus held that California’s 
later decision to reclassify the defendant’s felony to a misde-
meanor did not change the fact that the defendant’s prior convic-
tion for a felony drug offense had become final.157 
Beyond this statutory conclusion, multiple circuits explained 
that affording a defendant relief in his federal sentence, despite 
prior criminal history, is contrary to § 841’s purpose of punishing 
recidivism.158 They also emphasized that “[i]gnoring later state 
actions for purposes of federal sentences . . . aligns with the Su-
preme Court’s repeated admonishments that federal laws should 
be construed to achieve national uniformity.”159 Finally, the cir-
cuits noted that, unlike other federal sentencing statutes, Con-
gress did not include a provision explicitly saying that changes in 
state law retroactively affect § 841.160 
The reasoning of these § 841 cases has influenced other deci-
sions involving Proposition 47’s effect on federal sentencing. As 
 
 156 Santillan, 944 F3d at 733, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 973–74; Sanders, 909 F3d at 
901, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 973–74; London, 747 F Appx at 84, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d 
at 973–74; Diaz, 838 F3d at 973–74, quoting Dyke, 718 F3d at 1293. 
 157 See Santillan, 944 F3d at 733 (“Santillan was convicted of possession of marijuana 
for sale . . . , which was a felony under California law at that time. Thus, his California 
conviction qualifies as a ‘felony drug offense’ notwithstanding the fact it was later redes-
ignated as a misdemeanor.”); Sanders, 909 F3d at 901 (“California’s later decision to re-
classify the felony as a misdemeanor ‘does not alter the historical fact of the [prior state] 
conviction becoming final—which is what § 841 requires.’), quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 974 
(quotation marks and citation omitted); London, 747 F Appx at 84 (“[T]he decision of Cal-
ifornia voters to enact Proposition 47 does not change the fact that London committed his 
federal offense ‘after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense ha[d] become final.’”), 
quoting 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A). 
 158 See Sanders, 909 F3d at 902 (“[I]t’s unclear why a [federal] statute aimed at pun-
ishing recidivism . . . would afford the defendant relief in his federal sentence.”), quoting 
Diaz, 838 F3d at 974; London, 747 F Appx at 85 (“The sentence enhancements in § 841 
are also meant to combat recidivism. That purpose would not be served by affording a 
defendant relief from his federal sentence whenever a state provides him procedural relief 
related to a previous state conviction after he has already committed another federal drug 
offense.”), citing Diaz, 838 F3d at 974. 
 159 Sanders, 909 F3d at 902, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 974. See also London, 747 F 
Appx at 85. 
 160 See Sanders, 909 F3d at 901–02 (noting that Congress ensured expunged convic-
tions are disregarded under § 921(a)(20), but did not do so for § 841); London, 747 F Appx 
at 85 n 5 (“Congress could, of course, give retroactive effect to forms of relief under state 
law that are unrelated to trial error or actual innocence, and it has done so in other con-
texts.”); Diaz, 838 F3d at 974 (“Congress could, of course, give retroactive effect to changes 
in state law for purposes of federal statutes for policy reasons unrelated to innocence or 
an error of law. . . . Indeed, it has done so in other circumstances.”) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
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the following sections demonstrate, similar logic has been em-
ployed in cases regarding the Guidelines and postconviction con-
stitutional challenges. 
2. “Felony” under the Guidelines. 
Relying on its earlier reasoning in its § 841 case, United 
States v Diaz,161 the Ninth Circuit—the only circuit to squarely 
consider the issue—has held that convictions reclassified under 
Proposition 47 still constitute felonies for the Guidelines’ sentenc-
ing enhancements. In two different cases, the court considered 
the criminal history calculation162 and an offense-specific en-
hancement.163 In the latter, the specific enhancement increased 
the defendant’s sentence for his federal immigration offense 
based on a prior felony conviction “for which the sentence imposed 
was five years or more.”164 In the criminal history case, the district 
court treating the reclassified conviction “as a felony” increased 
the defendant’s criminal history points.165 
In both cases, the court explained that the proper approach 
is to “look[ ] to a defendant’s status at the time he commits the 
federal crime.”166 It then held that Proposition 47 did not change 
the “historical fact” of the defendant’s prior state conviction.167 
Thus, just as in the § 841 context, a reclassified conviction trig-
gered the Guidelines’ felony-based sentencing enhancements. 
 
 161 838 F3d 968 (9th Cir 2016). 
 162 See United States v Norwood, 733 F Appx 387, 389 (9th Cir 2018). 
 163 See United States v Bermudez-Zamora, 788 F Appx 523, 534 (9th Cir 2019). 
 164 Id at 524, quoting USSG § 2L1.2(b)(3). 
 165 Norwood, 733 F Appx at 389. Treating the defendant’s conviction as a felony 
yielded three criminal history points under USSG § 4A1.1(a), which directs courts to “[a]dd 
3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month.” If 
the district court had treated the conviction as a misdemeanor with a misdemeanant sen-
tence of imprisonment imposed, only two points would have been added. See USSG 
§ 4A1.1(b) (“Add 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days.”). 
The defendant in Norwood also received two additional points because he was on parole 
for his California conviction when he committed his instant federal offense. Norwood, 733 
F Appx at 389. 
 166 Norwood, 733 F Appx at 389, quoting Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1090. See Bermudez-
Zamora, 788 F Appx at 524 (“Nor can we find in § 2L1.2(b)(3) any support for Bermudez-
Zamora’s contention that we should evaluate the status of his state conviction as of the 
time he committed the federal offense, rather than the time of the original criminal con-
duct.”), citing McNeill, 563 US at 820. 
 167 Bermudez-Zamora, 788 F Appx at 524, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 974. See Norwood, 
733 F Appx at 389 (“The district court correctly determined that a reclassification under 
Proposition 47 did not alter these ‘historical fact[s].’”), quoting Yepez II, 704 F3d at 1090. 
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3. Postconviction relief for sentencing enhancements based 
on reclassified convictions. 
The prior cases dealt with defendants’ challenging of their en-
hanced sentences on direct appeal. Defendants have also reclassi-
fied their California offenses while imprisoned, and then chal-
lenged their enhanced federal sentence under § 2255, the primary 
form of federal postconviction relief.168 Because denials of § 2255 
motions can only be appealed if the defendant has made “a sub-
stantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” defendants 
in the Proposition 47 context have—to varying extents—presented 
constitutional arguments when petitioning for a certificate of ap-
pealability.169 These petitions have generally been denied.170 
Reaching the merits of a § 2255 motion, the Tenth Circuit de-
nied a defendant’s due process challenge to his § 841 enhance-
ment predicated on a reclassified California conviction.171 The de-
fendant relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson, which 
acknowledged a right to resentencing if a predicate offense has 
been “successfully attacked, vacated, or set aside,” to argue that 
his enhancement violated due process.172 The Tenth Circuit relied 
on other circuit court decisions to conclude that the defendant’s 
California conviction “remain[ed] authorized” by law, and he 
therefore “failed to demonstrate a due process violation” under 
Johnson.173 
Thus, in a variety of contexts, the circuit courts have denied 
defendants’ challenges to their federal sentencing enhancements 
based on convictions reclassified under Proposition 47. The next 
Part argues that this conclusion is not inevitable and that princi-
ples of comity support a contrary holding. 
 
 168 See 28 USC § 2255. For a further discussion of § 2255, see notes 92–95 and accom-
panying text. 
 169 28 USC § 2253(c)(2). 
 170 See United States v Ramos, 758 F Appx 316, 317 (4th Cir 2019) (holding that the 
defendant did not show “that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assess-
ment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong”); Munayco v United States, 2019 
WL 2285470, *1 (11th Cir) (same); United States v Bell, 689 F Appx 598, 599 (10th Cir 
2017) (holding that the defendant did not show “that reasonable jurists could debate 
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a dif-
ferent manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to 
proceed further”). 
 171 United States v McGee, 760 F Appx 610, 610–12 (10th Cir 2019). 
 172 Id at 612–13. 
 173 Id at 613. 
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III.  GIVING EFFECT TO RETROACTIVE STATE LAW CHANGES IN 
FEDERAL SENTENCING 
The federal circuit courts’ conclusion—that Proposition 47 
does not alter predicate offenses for federal sentencing—does not 
necessarily follow from Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme 
Court has never analyzed the effect of a retroactive state law, nor 
has it conclusively determined what state action can alter predi-
cate offenses. 
This Part argues that federal courts should allow Proposi-
tion 47 to affect federal sentencing. Part III.A argues that Propo-
sition 47 should be treated differently than other state laws con-
sidered by the Supreme Court—not only is Proposition 47 broader 
than the expungement law considered by the Supreme Court in 
Dickerson, it is much more akin to the state vacating the defend-
ant’s conviction. Part III.B then argues that principles of comity 
support federal courts following the California courts’ interpreta-
tion of Proposition 47. Finally, Part III.C discusses how this Com-
ment’s argument will provide relief for many federal defendants. 
Because the Supreme Court has not foreclosed treating retroac-
tively reclassified state convictions as misdemeanors for federal 
sentencing, this Comment argues that principles of comity and 
federalism, as well as the positive benefits to federal defendants, 
support giving Proposition 47 full effect in federal courts. 
A. Legal Precedent Supports Giving Effect to Retroactive 
Reclassification 
1. Proposition 47 is broader than expungement or 
dismissal. 
The Supreme Court has only considered the effect of a state 
expungement law and a state law that prospectively shortens an 
offense’s length of imprisonment. The circuit courts have treated 
Proposition 47 exactly like these laws. The Ninth Circuit, for ex-
ample, stated that “Proposition 47 presents a slight variation on 
what effect, if any, we must give to subsequent acts affecting a 
prior state sentence.”174 Other circuits even concluded that “dis-
missal or expungement is ‘a more drastic change than merely re-
classifying [a conviction] as a misdemeanor’ under 
 
 174 Diaz, 838 F3d at 973 (emphasis added). 
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Proposition 47.”175 But because Proposition 47 alters the defend-
ant’s underlying penalty, conviction, and conduct, it is broader 
than these laws, and should be treated differently. 
The California Supreme Court has explained that Proposi-
tion 47 alters the felonious nature of the defendant’s offense in 
numerous ways. Even though Proposition 47 did not “expressly 
mention recidivist offenders,” the court pointed to ballot materi-
als stating that “the measure reduces the penalties for the follow-
ing crimes,” which “extends logically to enhancements and subse-
quent offenses connected to those offenses.”176 In other words, 
California believes that these offenses simply do not deserve long 
sentences or recidivist punishment; the penalty attached to cer-
tain conduct is fundamentally altered. Indeed, the California Su-
preme Court has explained that Proposition 47 changes the na-
ture of the defendant’s underlying conduct. Under Proposition 47, 
“the reduction of defendant’s [ ] conviction to a misdemeanor es-
tablishes that he cannot be regarded as having engaged in feloni-
ous criminal conduct.”177 In California’s view, a certain class of 
conduct is no longer dangerous or serious enough to be a felony. 
Finally, the court has also held that Proposition 47 alters the un-
derlying felony conviction, because its text “mandates that a ‘fel-
ony conviction . . . shall be considered a misdemeanor for all pur-
poses.’”178 Thus, prospectively and retroactively, the defendant’s 
conviction accurately reflects California’s judgment on what con-
duct constitutes a felony and what penalties that conduct deserves. 
Unlike the laws considered by the Supreme Court, Proposi-
tion 47 changes the defendant’s underlying conviction. The pro-
spective change in length of imprisonment discussed in McNeill 
did not. Nor did the expungement law at issue in Dickerson. The 
Court explained in Dickerson: “[Expungement] in Iowa means no 
more than that the State has provided a means for the trial court 
not to accord a conviction certain continuing effects under state 
law.”179 Like other postconviction relief, Proposition 47 intends to 
ameliorate “certain continuing effects.” But in contrast to the 
Iowa expungement at issue in Dickerson, Proposition 47 
 
 175 United States v McGee, 760 F Appx 610, 615 (10th Cir 2019), quoting Diaz, 838 F3d 
at 974. See also United States v London, 747 F Appx 80, 84 (3d Cir 2018) (“[W]e have held that 
there is no impact on § 841 eligibility when the defendant’s prior state conviction is outright 
dismissed following probation, which is a more drastic change than reclassification.”). 
 176 People v Buycks, 422 P3d 531, 545–46 (Cal 2018) (emphasis in original). 
 177 People v Valenzuela, 441 P3d 896, 904 (Cal 2019) (emphasis in original). 
 178 Buycks, 422 P3d at 548 (emphasis added), quoting Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k). 
 179 Dickerson, 460 US at 115. 
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fundamentally changes the underlying conviction. According to 
the text of the statute (and the California Supreme Court) the 
conviction has been changed to a misdemeanor for all purposes. 
Expungement only “attempt[s] to conceal prior convictions or to 
remove some of their collateral or residual effects.”180 Proposi-
tion 47 does not merely “conceal” prior convictions—it changes 
them to misdemeanors. 
Even though Proposition 47 changes the conviction from a 
felony to a misdemeanor, “some of” the felony’s “residual effects” 
remain.181 For example, Proposition 47 does not apply if the de-
fendant has a conviction for certain violent or sexual offenses.182 
This is similar to a sentencing enhancement: if the defendant has 
a designated prior offense, he receives a felony and a higher pen-
alty. The more challenging issue with Proposition 47 is its firearm 
provision, which prohibits firearm possession for individuals who 
have received resentencing and does not remove these individu-
als’ felon status for purposes of California’s felon-in-possession-
of-a-firearm law.183 But the California Supreme Court has ex-
plained that this “single exception to the collateral effect of Prop-
osition 47’s resentencing provisions” actually bolsters the argu-
ment that reclassified convictions cannot be predicate offenses.184 
Proposition 47’s “mandate to reduce penalties for a distinct class 
of . . . offenses otherwise fully extends to enhancements and sub-
sequent offenses alleged with those offenses.”185 In other words, 
because the firearm restriction is the sole exception to the “for all 
purposes” language, no other exceptions—including recidivist en-
hancements—can be allowed. 
Proposition 47 is also broader than other laws because it ret-
roactively changes the defendant’s penalty by allowing resentenc-
ing and redesignation. Federal statutes and the Guidelines im-
pose enhancements based on potential or actual length of 
imprisonment—in other words, federal law cares about penalties 
as a proxy for the crime’s severity. Expungement does not univer-
sally lower the offense’s penalty, unlike Proposition 47. Mean-
while, the law in McNeill did lower the offense’s penalty, but only 
prospectively. Neither law indicates an intent by the state to 
 
 180 Id at 121. 
 181 See id. 
 182 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(b), (i). 
 183 Cal Penal Code § 1170.18(k). 
 184 Buycks, 422 P3d at 546. 
 185 Id. 
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reduce the penalty attached to certain conduct, both prospectively 
and retroactively. In contrast, the California Supreme Court ex-
plained that Proposition 47 shows that certain conduct (posses-
sory drug offenses and minor theft) is no longer “felonious crimi-
nal conduct.”186 Although “conviction” is defined by federal law, 
states still have the power to determine what conduct is criminal. 
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Dickerson, “predicate of-
fense[s] and [their] punishment are defined by the law of the 
State.”187 Proposition 47 changes what conduct is felonious. In 
other words, the act of possessing drugs or committing petty theft 
is no longer felonious in California. And by making this change ret-
roactive, California made clear that this conduct was never feloni-
ous under state law. According to California’s current law and 
(through retroactive reclassification) past law, possessing drugs or 
committing minor theft cannot, and never did, constitute a felony. 
Because Proposition 47 is broader than the laws considered 
by the Supreme Court, it should be treated differently. But the 
circuit courts disagree. They have limited the exceptions to the 
general rule that state action does not affect federal sentencing to 
actions based on legal error or actual innocence. And they have 
largely ignored Proposition 47’s retroactivity, instead focusing on 
the “historical fact” of conviction. 
2.  Federal courts should not focus on literal vacatur. 
In treating Proposition 47 like “dismissal or expungement” 
for federal sentencing purposes, the circuit courts have applied 
their very narrow interpretation of “prior conviction.”188 The cir-
cuits have generally held that state action does not affect the fact 
of a prior conviction.189 The exception to this rule, which stems 
from Dickerson, is where the “predicate conviction ha[s] been va-
cated or reversed on direct appeal.”190 Some circuits have indi-
cated that this exception only applies if the vacatur was due to 
 
 186 See Valenzuela, 441 P3d at 904 (“[T]he theft of Ramirez’s $ 200 bicycle—the same 
conduct that gave rise to defendant’s conviction for grand theft—constituted the felonious 
criminal conduct involved with his conviction for street terrorism. In light of defendant’s 
Proposition 47 resentencing, that theft can no longer be regarded as felonious.”). 
 187 Dickerson, 460 US at 112. 
 188 See, for example, McGee, 760 F Appx at 615, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 974. 
 189 See Part II.B. 
 190 United States v Sanders, 909 F3d 895, 902 (7th Cir 2018), quoting Dickerson, 460 
US at 115. 
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“innocence or errors of law,” at least for the Guidelines.191 Other 
circuits have indicated that state laws like expungement can 
qualify for the Dickerson exception if they “alter[ ] the legality of 
the original state conviction—such as where there was a trial er-
ror or it appears the defendant was actually innocent of the un-
derlying crime.”192 
For multiple reasons, however, language from Supreme 
Court cases suggests that circuit courts need not interpret this 
exception so narrowly. The Court explained in Dickerson: 
[W]e recognized an obvious exception to the literal language 
of the statute for one whose predicate conviction had been 
vacated or reversed on direct appeal. . . . But, in contrast, [ex-
pungement] does not alter the legality of the previous convic-
tion and does not signify that the defendant was innocent of 
the crime to which he pleaded guilty. . . . Clearly, firearms dis-
abilities may be attached constitutionally to an expunged con-
viction, . . . and an exception for such a conviction, unlike one 
reversed or vacated due to trial error, is far from obvious.193 
First, in this passage, the Court did not expressly state that va-
cated convictions are the only convictions that are exempted. Sec-
ond, although trial error is an “obvious” exception, the Court did 
not preclude other state laws from affecting the underlying con-
victions. Finally, the Court does not expressly define what it 
means to “alter the legality of the previous conviction.” Taken to-
gether, this demonstrates that the Court left open the possibility 
of a broader definition of which state actions alter the underlying 
conviction for federal sentencing. 
In Johnson, the Court similarly declined to define when ex-
actly an underlying conviction can be altered for federal sentenc-
ing. In a series of sentencing procedure cases leading up to John-
son, the Court consistently recognized that “a defendant who 
successfully attack[s] his state conviction in state court or on fed-
eral habeas review [can] then ‘apply for reopening of any federal 
 
 191 See, for example, United States v Martinez-Cortez, 354 F3d 830, 832 (8th Cir 2004) 
(“If [defendant]’s convictions had been vacated for the express purpose of enabling him to 
become eligible for the safety valve, the sentences would have counted because the convic-
tions would have been set aside for reasons unrelated to his innocence or errors of law.”). 
 192 Diaz, 838 F3d at 973, citing United States v Norbury, 492 F3d 1012, 1015 (9th 
Cir 2007). 
 193 Dickerson, 460 US at 115. 
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sentence enhanced by the state sentences.’”194 At times the John-
son opinion seems to suggest that a “successful attack” means a 
state vacatur: “Our cases . . . assume . . . that a defendant given 
a sentence enhanced for a prior conviction is entitled to a reduc-
tion if the earlier conviction is vacated.”195 At other times, it fo-
cuses on the validity of the prior conviction: “Congress does not 
appear to have adopted a policy of enhancing federal sentences 
regardless of the validity of state convictions relied on for the en-
hancement.”196 “Validity” is not defined, but implies something 
broader than just vacatur. Unlike vacatur, “validity” does not sug-
gest a specific state procedure. Nor is it necessarily limited to le-
gal error or actual innocence. Rather, an invalid conviction im-
plies that it is not recognized in state court—just like reclassified 
convictions are not recognized as felonies in California court. 
When analyzing Proposition 47, the circuit courts conflated 
these different terms, at times using “vacated,” and at times using 
“successfully attacked.” The Seventh Circuit, for example, 
acknowledged that laws altering “the legality of the original state 
conviction” mean the conviction cannot be a predicate offense.197 
But it then stated: “Proposition 47 [ ] does not ‘vacate’ prior felony 
convictions; it reclassifies them as misdemeanors. Thus, Johnson 
is not helpful to [the defendant]’s argument.”198 This argument 
implies a law must vacate a conviction to affect federal sentenc-
ing. Similarly, although the Tenth Circuit stated that Johnson 
applies where the predicate conviction was “vacated or success-
fully attacked,” it went on to distinguish “between a conviction 
that has been vacated because of a constitutional error or actual 
innocence and a conviction that has merely been reclassified as a 
matter of legislative grace.”199 
Proposition 47’s effect on nonfinal judgments is more similar 
to state vacatur than expungement. The Seventh Circuit ex-
plained: “When a state court ‘vacates’ a prior conviction, it, in ef-
fect, nullifies that conviction; it is as if that conviction no longer 
 
 194 Johnson, 544 US at 303 (emphasis added), quoting Custis v United States, 511 US 
485, 497 (1994). 
 195 Johnson, 544 at 303 (emphasis added). 
 196 Id at 305–06 (emphasis added). See also id at 303 (“[T]he mandatory enhancement 
under the [ACCA] has [not] been read to mean that the validity of a prior conviction sup-
porting an enhanced federal sentence is beyond challenge.”). 
 197 Sanders, 909 F3d at 903. 
 198 Id. 
 199 McGee, 760 F Appx at 615 (emphasis added). 
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exists.”200 This is what California did for nonfinal judgments—for 
state purposes, the felony conviction no longer exists. California 
has decided that the underlying conduct no longer constitutes a 
felony. Thus, the penalties and collateral effects of a felony con-
viction can no longer attach to drug possession and minor theft. 
In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit cites to a California court that 
explained precisely this point: 
[O]ne of the “chief” reasons for reclassifying a felony as a mis-
demeanor “is that under such circumstances the offense is 
not considered to be serious enough to entitle the court to re-
sort to it as a prior conviction of a felony for the purposes of 
increasing the penalty for a subsequent crime.”201 
Despite acknowledging that California did “not consider[ ]” pos-
sessory drug offenses “to be serious enough” to be a felony convic-
tion,202 the Seventh Circuit treated it exactly like a felony.203 
Unlike postconviction relief that simply offers legislative 
grace, Proposition 47 comes much closer to altering the underly-
ing legality of the felony conviction. A successful petition for re-
designation or resentencing in state court also comes closer to the 
other terms the Supreme Court used in Johnson—a “successful at-
tack” changing the underlying “validity” of the felony conviction. 
3. Retroactivity alters the historical fact of conviction. 
Finally, and importantly, the Supreme Court has never ruled 
on how a retroactive state law affects federal sentencing. The 
Court’s holding in McNeill only applies to state laws that prospec-
tively lower the term of imprisonment, and the Court expressly 
declined to decide what would happen if that state law was retro-
actively applied to defendants.204 
Despite this open question, the circuits either rejected or 
failed to meaningfully consider the effect of Proposition 47’s ret-
roactivity. The circuits explained that although Congress could 
“give retroactive effect to changes in state law[s]” and has in other 
situations, it did not do so for § 841.205 The Third Circuit had no 
 
 200 Sanders, 909 F3d at 902. 
 201 Id at 900, quoting People v Abdallah, 201 Cal Rptr 3d 198, 206 (2016). 
 202 Sanders, 909 F3d at 900. 
 203 Id at 903. 
 204 McNeill, 563 US at 825 n 1. 
 205 Sanders, 909 F3d at 901–02, quoting Diaz, 838 F3d at 974; London, 747 F Appx at 
85 n 5. 
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further analysis regarding Proposition 47’s retroactivity. The 
Ninth Circuit first noted that it is unclear whether California ap-
plies Proposition 47 retroactively, an issue which has since been 
decided by the California Supreme Court.206 The Ninth Circuit 
then explained that “even if California decided to give Proposi-
tion 47 retroactive effect for purposes of its own state law, that 
would not retroactively make [the defendant]’s felony conviction 
a misdemeanor for purposes of federal law.”207 To support this, the 
court simply reiterated that “§ 841 explicitly tells us when it ap-
plies,” and that § 841 applies in this case.208 The Tenth Circuit 
extensively quoted the Ninth Circuit’s decision without expand-
ing on it.209 Finally, the Seventh Circuit briefly mentioned the 
Eleventh Circuit’s examination of a retroactive New York sen-
tencing law. The Seventh Circuit, quoting the Eleventh Circuit’s 
language that discusses McNeill, explained “that the defendant 
could ‘succeed on the merits of his [challenge to his federal sen-
tencing enhancement] only if the New York sentencing reductions 
apply retroactively.’”210 The Seventh Circuit stated that this was 
“mere dicta,” without engaging in the retroactivity argument.211 
Retroactivity should impact the federal courts’ analysis be-
cause it alters the “historical fact” of conviction. In McNeill, the 
Court explained why a prospective state law change did not alter 
the historical fact of conviction: “A defendant’s history of criminal 
activity—and the culpability and dangerousness that such his-
tory demonstrates—does not cease to exist when a State reformu-
lates its criminal statutes in a way that prevents precise transla-
tion of the old conviction into the new statutes.”212 
When federal courts find the historical fact of conviction, they 
are not finding the underlying culpability or dangerousness of a 
defendant. Rather, the only fact that they are constitutionally al-
lowed to find is the fact of conviction.213 And the Supreme Court 
has noted that “a claim of [the fact of conviction] is subject to proof 
or disproof like any other factual issue.”214 Under Proposition 47, 
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 207 Id at 975 (emphasis in original). 
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a defendant’s historical conviction can be disproved, because the 
fact of the defendant’s felony ceases to exist. California has 
reached back into the defendant’s history and changed a felony to 
a misdemeanor. This reclassification does not prevent “precise 
translation of the old conviction.” Rather, it facilitates a very clear 
translation of the old conviction (felony) to the new conviction 
(misdemeanor). 
The emphasis on the historical fact of conviction explains why 
courts look to the law at the time of conviction, rather than cur-
rent law. But with retroactive laws, looking to historical law pro-
duces odd results. Under Proposition 47, California declared that 
the historical statute does not exist, even for defendants convicted 
under that statute. A passage from McNeill highlights the prob-
lems with the historical fact approach: 
Although North Carolina courts actually sentenced him to 10 
years in prison for his drug offenses, McNeill now contends 
that the maximum term of imprisonment for those offenses 
is 30 or 38 months. We find it hard to accept the proposition 
that a defendant may lawfully [have] be[en] sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment that exceeds the “maximum term of 
imprisonment . . . prescribed by law.”215 
Because the North Carolina statute was not retroactive, McNeill’s 
longer sentence was still lawful. In California, on the other hand, 
it is not lawful for people with reclassified convictions to serve a 
longer felony term; when their sentence is reclassified, defend-
ants are resentenced. Proposition 47 explicitly mandates that 
“[r]esentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in the im-
position of a term longer than the original sentence.”216 Unlike 
nonretroactive laws, a defendant can no longer lawfully be im-
prisoned based on his prior California conviction. Proposition 47’s 
retroactivity therefore alters a key lynchpin in the courts’ analy-
sis—the historical fact of conviction. 
B. Federalism and Proposition 47 
For the aforementioned reasons, this Comment concludes 
that under federal law, the federal courts should give effect to 
Proposition 47. This Section argues that even though federal law 
defines federal recidivist enhancements, principles of comity and 
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federalism support considering the state’s interpretation of its 
law. Contrary to the federal courts’ argument, considering Cali-
fornia’s interpretation of Proposition 47 does not undermine fed-
eral interests, including federal supremacy. 
1. Principles of comity. 
Comity is a difficult-to-define set of norms originally stem-
ming from international law.217 At its base, it refers to the general 
principle that a governmental entity should respect another sov-
ereign’s laws.218 The Supreme Court has defined “comity” as “the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the leg-
islative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation.”219 The Court 
has also explained that comity “is neither a matter of absolute 
obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and good will.”220 In other 
words, comity does not compel one sovereign to defer to another—
it is a voluntary decision.221 
Comity and federalism are closely related: because the states 
are separate sovereigns, the federal government should respect 
their laws and judgments.222 As the Supreme Court famously de-
scribed in Younger v Harris:223 
[Comity represents] a system in which there is sensitivity to 
the legitimate interests of both State and National Govern-
ments and in which the National Government, anxious 
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and 
federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will 
not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the 
States.224 
 
 217 Seinfeld, 90 Notre Dame L Rev at 1312 & n 6 (cited in note 130) (describing comity 
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The Supreme Court has frequently relied on comity in cases re-
quiring the federal government to defer to the states.225 The most 
significant of these comity-based doctrines are the abstention doc-
trines, which require federal courts “to decline to exercise [their] 
jurisdiction in favor of the jurisdiction of a state court.”226 The 
Court has also relied on comity to restrict federal habeas review 
of state criminal convictions,227 and federal supplemental jurisdic-
tion over related state law claims.228 
Although the Supreme Court has relied on comity in these 
areas of law, few courts have referenced these principles in the 
Proposition 47 context, or in the context of state predicate of-
fenses more generally.229 But this context raises a particularly 
strong argument for employing comity. Comity would direct fed-
eral courts to respect California’s treatment of Proposition 47—
its own criminal law. Because criminal law has traditionally been 
the state’s domain, principles of comity and federalism are partic-
ularly salient.230 However, increasing federalization of the crimi-
nal justice system has led to the current system of dual jurisdic-
tion.231 Under this system, “each sovereign—whether the Federal 
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Government or a State—is responsible for the administration of 
its own criminal justice system.”232 Though at least one court has 
argued that this means state law cannot infringe on federal law 
by defining prior conviction,233 there is another interpretation of 
dual sovereignty. Under this view, because the state administers 
its own criminal law and justice system, the federal government 
should respect its decisions when possible. 
This application of comity avoids several issues that arise in 
other comity-based doctrines. Scholarly criticism of the use of 
comity in the abstention doctrines does not apply to this Com-
ment’s argument.234 Most of these criticisms rest on the idea that 
federal courts “are, or should be, the primary guardians of federal 
rights”235 and that abstention “hampers a plaintiff’s access to a 
lower federal court, even though the federal court has jurisdic-
tion.”236 In the Proposition 47 context, comity does not prevent 
any individual from pursuing their federal rights in federal court, 
nor does it strip federal courts of their jurisdiction. Rather, fed-
eral courts will still interpret federal sentencing enhancements, 
thus guarding the national government’s interests. But they will 
also respect California’s decision to retroactively change what 
conduct constitutes a felony, as well as a state court’s decision to 
approve a retroactive change to the defendant’s underlying state 
conviction. Looking to California’s treatment of reclassified con-
victions perfectly falls within the Supreme Court’s articulation of 
comity without undermining federal interests. Federal courts 
would recognize California’s legislative and judicial acts within 
“its territory”—within the federal system. 
2. Federal supremacy is not threatened by Proposition 47. 
As discussed in the prior Section, issues of comity and federal-
ism have not been emphasized in the Proposition 47 cases. Only 
the Seventh Circuit considered any federalism argument. It sum-
marily rejected the argument by explaining that the defendant did 
not “identify any individual right embodied in the Constitution or 
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in a federal statute that allows [her] to challenge [her] sentence 
based on vague notions about the ‘principles of federalism.’”237 The 
Seventh Circuit concluded: “Put simply, . . . federal law, and not 
state law, ‘dictate[s] the meaning of a federal statute.’”238 
However, the Ninth Circuit focused heavily on comity when 
deciding whether a state court’s retroactive change to a defend-
ant’s probation length affected his Guidelines calculation.239 In 
the initial panel decision (and the dissent from the en banc deci-
sion), Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw emphasized the comity argu-
ment from Younger v Harris.240 The en banc majority rejected this 
argument: “[G]ranting a state court the power to determine 
whether a federal defendant is eligible for safety valve relief un-
der the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is closer to abdication than 
comity.”241 It concluded that “[s]tate courts cannot be given the 
authority to change a defendant’s federal sentence by issuing a 
ruling that alters history and the underlying facts.”242 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuit’s rejections of comity and fed-
eralism rest primarily on the idea of federal supremacy. This su-
premacy idea has been reiterated by many federal courts inter-
preting Proposition 47’s effect—state law cannot alter federal 
law. The primary reason federal supremacy is not threatened un-
der this Comment’s argument is that federal law still defines 
“prior conviction.” Nothing—including principles of comity or fed-
eralism—requires federal courts to defer to the California Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of Proposition 47. This Comment 
simply argues that federal courts should define prior conviction 
more broadly, to account for the unique nature of Proposition 47 
and California’s interpretation of it. But federal courts, not state 
courts, still define federal law. 
Moreover, it is unclear how the supremacy of federal law is 
undermined by giving effect to California’s interpretation of state 
law. The federal government’s interest is in “vindicat[ing] and 
protect[ing] federal rights.”243 Following a state’s interpretation of 
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its laws does not extinguish any federal claim.244 The federal 
claim—prosecution of the defendant’s instant federal offense—is 
not extinguished by a state’s interpretation of the predicate of-
fense. Indeed, allowing states to prospectively change their under-
lying predicate offenses inherently gives them the “authority to 
change a defendant’s federal sentence.”245 But no one argues that 
Proposition 47’s prospective reclassification of certain offenses is 
an abdication of federal law. Given this reality, it is not clear why 
retroactive reclassification should be treated differently. 
Similarly, the federal courts’ strong emphasis on federal law 
ignores the fact that the national government has made federal 
sentencing dependent on state law through recidivist enhance-
ments. As the Ninth Circuit dissent articulated, “the entire con-
cept of calculating criminal history points is predicated on respect 
for and deference to state court criminal proceedings; the system 
would unravel if district courts were to second-guess the motives 
of every state court judge who had previously convicted or sen-
tenced a defendant.”246 This principle extends to all federal recid-
ivist enhancements. Giving effect to the state’s interpretation of 
its law does not abdicate control over federal law. Because recidi-
vist enhancements are dependent on state law, considering the 
state court’s criminal proceedings does not flout the supremacy of 
federal law. 
In sum, federal supremacy is not threatened by applying 
principles of comity to federal recidivist enhancements. As the 
next Section discusses, nor do other federal concerns counsel 
against this application of comity. 
3. Recidivism, national uniformity, and federal sentencing 
concerns do not support the courts’ current approach. 
In addition to overarching concerns about federal supremacy, 
the circuits identified several additional federal concerns purport-
edly justifying their conclusion that Proposition 47 does not affect 
federal sentencing. Many argued that giving effect to 
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Proposition 47 conflicts with Congress’s intent to punish recidi-
vism.247 Under this Comment’s argument, however, the federal 
enhancements would still punish recidivism. The enhancements 
would just punish felony offenses, rather than misdemeanor of-
fenses. Going forward, people who commit most possessory drug 
offenses and minor theft in California will not be “punished” un-
der felony-based enhancements. If this is not contrary to Con-
gress’s intent, it is unclear why giving retroactive effect to Propo-
sition 47 is. 
The circuits also noted that allowing Proposition 47 to affect 
federal sentencing undermines national uniformity.248 The con-
cern regarding national uniformity is weak in this context. Be-
cause predicate offenses are based on irregular state law, an in-
herent lack of uniformity already exists. And defining conviction 
historically creates a lack of uniformity prospectively—people 
sentenced in California prior to Proposition 47 will receive differ-
ent sentences than people sentenced after. Moreover, although 
national uniformity has benefits, so too does local variance. For 
example, local variance allows the states to act as laboratories of 
democracy when enacting criminal justice reforms249 and ensures 
voters’ preferences are better reflected in sentencing laws.250 
Though not expressly articulated by any circuit, an addi-
tional concern with this Comment’s approach is that giving retro-
active reclassification effect in federal sentencing will allow states 
to change federal sentencing at will. This argument suggests that 
states will retroactively alter many of their criminal offenses. 
However, besides California, only Oklahoma has passed a retro-
active reclassification law.251 This seems to indicate that practical 
and political safeguards will continue to mitigate any concern 
about a flood of retroactive reclassification laws.252 More 
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importantly, this concern must be tempered by respect for the 
state’s ability to define its own laws. Because the federal govern-
ment relies on state predicate offenses, it must trust the states to 
define their initial offenses and punishments. This trust in the 
states’ lawmaking ability—and respect for these laws under prin-
ciples of comity—applies equally to retroactive reclassification. 
The limiting principle of this Comment’s argument is trusting in 
the state’s ability to legislate its criminal laws. 
Indeed, the federal courts’ current approach raises a differ-
ent—and perhaps more troubling—problem. Nothing (including 
principles of comity or federalism) requires federal courts to re-
spect California’s interpretation of Proposition 47. Although fed-
eral courts can continue to hold that Proposition 47 (and other 
state laws) have no effect on prior convictions for federal sentenc-
ing purposes, this leads to concerning questions about states’ abil-
ity to control their predicate offenses. Even if California’s legisla-
tion had more clearly evinced an intent to erase prior state 
convictions, it is unclear how federal courts would react. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has established an exception for va-
cated convictions, suggesting that California should have de-
clared possessory drug offenses “vacated.”253 Even ignoring the 
practical and legal issues with this approach, federal courts could 
still refuse to give such vacaturs effect, because they would not be 
based on legal error or actual innocence.254 What then, if any-
thing, can a state do to ensure its laws are effectuated in federal 
court? 
This Comment argues that a better approach is a fuller trust 
in the states’ ability to enact criminal law. Part of this trust is 
that when states decide to pass laws like Proposition 47, they are 
given effect in federal court. Because federal defendants are in-
carcerated based on state offenses, effectuating state ameliorative 
laws in federal court will provide relief to state and federal pris-
oners. The next Section discusses how this Comment’s proposed 
conclusion would impact federal sentencing. 
 
1150, Colorado General Assembly, 77th General Assembly, 2d Regular Sess (Jan 
17, 2020). 
 253 Dickerson, 460 US at 115. 
 254 See notes 191–92 and accompanying text. 
2020] Proposition 47 and Federal Sentencing 1841 
 
C. Impact on Federal Sentencing and Resentencing 
In addition to impacting the general federal-state balance of 
power, holding that Proposition 47 affects federal sentencing 
would directly impact federal sentencing and federal prisoners. 
Nearly 1,000,000 people are eligible for reclassification under 
Proposition 47, and almost 280,000 reclassification petitions were 
submitted between Proposition 47’s enactment on November 
2014 and September 2016.255 
It is not obvious how this Comment’s interpretation of Propo-
sition 47 affects people currently serving an enhanced federal sen-
tence. The California Supreme Court has mostly avoided this issue 
by holding that state prisoners can challenge already-imposed 
state enhancements only if the judgment containing the enhance-
ment was not final when Proposition 47 was enacted.256 This dis-
tinction has been suggested by some district courts, but not the 
circuit courts.257 If federal courts defer to California’s interpreta-
tion of Proposition 47’s retroactivity, most postconviction relief 
would be barred—only those whose federal judgments were not 
final could challenge their enhanced sentences. 
However, this Comment’s argument would affect federal pris-
oners who received a federal enhancement after reclassifying 
their California offense but were denied relief by a federal court. 
Whether federal prisoners can receive postconviction relief in this 
case depends on a number of factors, including whether the de-
fendant has previously filed for relief. Section 2255,258 the princi-
pal form of federal postconviction relief, sharply limits “second or 
successive motion[s]” to situations where there is “newly discov-
ered evidence” or “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroac-
tive . . . by the Supreme Court.”259 This would likely bar any fed-
eral prisoner who already brought a § 2255 motion. In some 
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circuits, however, federal prisoners could file a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, which is distinct from § 2255.260 Federal prisoners 
can bring a writ of habeas corpus at any time if the prisoner’s 
§ 2255 motion was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality 
of his detention.”261 The circuits are deeply split on what qualifies 
as “inadequate or ineffective.”262 Thus, whether a defendant who 
already filed a § 2255 motion could receive relief under habeas is 
highly dependent on the circuit. 
If the defendant has not previously filed a § 2255 motion, she 
can likely receive relief. Enhancements based on vacated or “suc-
cessfully attacked” convictions can be challenged under § 2255 
motions.263 Section 2255’s one-year statute of limitations nor-
mally runs from the date the defendant’s federal conviction be-
came final.264 The Supreme Court has held that this one-year pe-
riod restarts “when a petitioner receives notice of the order 
vacating the prior conviction, provided that he has sought it with 
due diligence in state court, after entry of judgment in the federal 
case with the enhanced sentence.”265 This suggests that the stat-
ute of limitations would run from the date the defendant receives 
notice of her Proposition 47 reclassification, as long as she acted 
diligently in obtaining the reclassification.266 
Allowing Proposition 47 to affect federal sentencing would 
clearly impact people who violate a federal statute after reclassify-
ing their California conviction. In that case—just like in California 
state court—the predicate offense no longer exists. Any felony-
based federal enhancement is simply unavailable. Thus, people 
 
 260 See 28 USC § 2241. Section 2241, the codification of the traditional writ of habeas 
corpus, has been largely displaced by § 2255. See LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 28.9(a) 
(cited in note 92). 
 261 28 USC § 2255(e). Section 2255(e) also prohibits courts from reviewing § 2241 pe-
titions by prisoners “authorized to apply for relief under § 2255.” See LaFave, Criminal 
Procedure § 28.9(b) (cited in note 92) (quotation marks omitted). Taken together, 
§ 2255(e)—also called the “savings clause”—allows federal prisoners to obtain relief under 
§ 2241 only under the “inadequate or ineffective” language. See id. 
 262 See Lauren Casale, Note, Back to the Future: Permitting Habeas Petitions Based 
on Intervening Retroactive Case Law to Alter Convictions and Sentences, 87 Fordham L 
Rev 1577, 1588–97 (2019). 
 263 Johnson, 544 US at 303 (“Our cases . . . assume . . . that a defendant given a sen-
tence enhanced for a prior conviction is entitled to a reduction if the earlier conviction is 
vacated.”). 
 264 See 28 USC § 2255(f)(1). 
 265 Johnson, 544 US at 298. 
 266 See United States v Summey, 2015 US Dist LEXIS 175511, *5–6 (CD Cal) (holding 
that § 2255’s statute of limitation runs from when the Proposition 47 designation of de-
fendant’s prior conviction became discoverable). 
2020] Proposition 47 and Federal Sentencing 1843 
 
who reclassify their convictions and subsequently violate a fed-
eral statute will likely receive lower sentences. 
The inherent safeguards on postconviction relief limit any 
negative effects of this Comment’s argument by ensuring federal 
judges are not flooded with requests for postconviction relief. Im-
portantly, however, this Comment would allow for resentencing 
under § 2255 for some federal prisoners. Moreover, if reclassified 
California convictions no longer constitute predicate felonies, it 
would deeply impact defendants’ sentences moving forward. 
CONCLUSION 
Proposition 47 is one of many recent state reforms attempt-
ing to ameliorate harsh criminal laws. Unlike many other state 
laws, Proposition 47 explicitly intends to mitigate the collateral 
effects of a felony conviction. The California Supreme Court has 
therefore held that reclassified felony convictions are misdemean-
ors for the purpose of state sentencing enhancements. The federal 
courts, however, have held that reclassified convictions are still 
felonies for the purpose of federal sentencing enhancements. 
If the Seventh Circuit had given effect to California’s reclas-
sification of Vickie Sanders’s conviction, she would have received 
a five-year sentence for her simple drug possession.267 Instead, her 
reclassified conviction—which California treats as a misde-
meanor—triggered a ten-year sentencing enhancement.268 The 
Seventh Circuit’s approach is not mandated by Supreme Court 
precedent. The Court has left open the issue of retroactive state 
law changes. And Proposition 47 is more than just a retroactive 
state law change. It does not merely offer legislative grace ame-
liorating the collateral effects of a felony conviction. It represents 
California’s substantive decision that certain conduct—posses-
sory drug offenses and petty theft—is not, and never has been, a 
felony. Federal courts should give effect to California’s decision. 
Of course, federal courts could continue to hold that federal 
sentencing is not affected by Proposition 47 or any similar state 
law in the future. This leads to the troubling outcome that 
states—no matter their intent or clear language—cannot do any-
thing to alter their own predicate offenses. Nor can they enact 
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truly retroactive state laws or erase prior state convictions. Fed-
eral courts should not reach this conclusion. Rather, federal 
courts should give effect to states’ clear intent in enacting amelio-
rative laws. In this case, federal courts should listen to Califor-
nia’s intent and hold that a reclassified California conviction is 
not a prior conviction for federal sentencing. 
 
